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In the

upreme Court of the State of Utah
LARENCE M. STAMP,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8463

NION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for personal injuries brought under
1e Federal Employers' Liability Act ( 45 U. S. C. A., Sec.
1 et seq.), which will be referred to hereinafter as the
'. E. L. A. The respondent, Clarence M. Stamp, will be
~ferred to as the plaintiff; and the appelant, Union Pacific
,ailroad Company, will be referred to as the defendant.
The plaintiff, Clarence M. Stamp, employed by the
efendant since March 1942 as a brakeman or conductor
R. 11) was on November 6, 1954 working as the rear
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brakeman on a 99-car freight train proceeding from Rawlins, Wyoming, west to Green River, Wyoming (R. 19, 20).
The plaintiff was riding in the caboose at the rear of the
train as the train approached Green River, when the train
slowed down, then came to a stop, which the plaintiff
claimed was rougher than an ordinary stop ; and a flagman's kit containing fusees and torpedoes, used by brakemen to flag trains, was thrown from the bench on which
it was located to the floor of the caboose (R. 24) . The
plaintiff observed that the fusees and a strip of torpedoes
had slid out of the kit and were lying on the floor (R. 26).
The plaintiff described the torpedoes as follows :
"These torpedoes * * * are approximately
two inches square-probably a half-inch thick.
Written across them is the word 'Danger'. Then,
extending on each side of this torpedo and fastened
to it is a metal strap. It extends out approximately
three inches on each side of the torepdo."
Q. (By plaintiff's counsel) "Explain to us
how that is used."
A. "When we place a torpedo on the track, we
place it with the word 'Danger' up * * * then
we clamp each end of the strap around the rail to
hold it to the rail."
Q.

A.

"Are these torpedoes explosive?"
"Yes, sir" (R. 15).

The function of the torpedo is to explode when an
engine goes over it, and such explosion is a warning signal
to the engineer (R. 14). The fusee is a cylindrical object
about an inch in diameter, about 10 to 12 inches long, with
a spike about 4 inches long on one end of it. (See Exhibits
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~and

5.) The flagman's kit (See Exhibit 1) had two compartments and was about the length of a fusee.

After the caboose slowed down, the plaintiff states he
put the flagman's kit up on its end, put the strip of torpedoes in one compartment of the kit, then dropped a fusee
spike down into the other compartment, and an explosion
Dccurred (R. 27).
The explosion blinded the plaintiff temporarily, and
he staggered back to a bench and sat down (R. 28).
The train then started up again and proceeded into
the depot and stopped, and plaintiff was driven to a doctor's office (R. 30). Doctors examined his eyes and decided he should be sent to a specialist in Cheyenne (R. 31).
The accident occurred about 10:10 a. m. (R. 2) and
about 12 :30 p. m. plaintiff boarded an eastbound train
for Cheyenne, accompanied by an Assistant Superintendent
(R. 39). By this time he could distinguish the light of a
match with his right eye but could still see nothing out of
his left eye (R. 39). He entered a hospital at Cheyenne
at 6 :20 p. m. November 6, 1954, where he was examined and
treated by an eye specialist.
He remained in the hospital until November 10, 1954.
Dn the morning of November 8 the bandage was removed
from his right eye and was left off, and he states that he
'could see to get around the hospital" (R. 41, 42). On the
norning of November 9 he left the hospital and went to the
loctor's office, where he was examined again. The doctor
~emoved the bandage from his left eye and asked him to
~ead a chart, and he claims he couldn't see the chart with
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his left eye. The left eye was re-bandaged, and he returned
to the hospital. The next morning, the lOth, he was examined by the doctor again, the bandage removed from
his left eye, and the doctor sent him home and asked him to
report back in a week. He checked out of the hospital and
returned to his home in Rawlins, Wyoming (R. 43).
He states that when he got home, his right eye "didn't
seem to bother me at all", but his left eye still gave him
concern; but he could see out of it to an impaired degree
(R. 44). He returned to the doctor on November 17, and
the doctor examined his eyes and told him he could go to
work (R. 45). He returned to work on the afternoon of
the 17th or 18th (R. 46). The only time lost by reason of
the accident was from November 6 to November 17 or 18,
or eleven or twelve days (R. 46). He testified his wage
was between $550 and $600 a month (R. 12).
He complained in his testimony of the unpleasantness
of particles working out of his eyes (R. 48) and of headaches that occurred on sunny days if he didn't wear dark
glasses, which headaches were relieved when he put on
dark glasses; and he claimed constant worry about his eyesight (R. 47).
He testified that the Cheyenne specialist told him the
headaches were not due to his eyes (R. 50).
Dr. Bascom \V. Palmer of Salt Lake City was called by
the plaintiff to testify in his behalf, and his entire testimony is as follows :
"Q. (By plaintiff's counsel) Will you tell us
your name, please?
"A. Doctor Bascom W. Palmer.
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I

"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

You live in Salt Lake City?
Yes, sir.
Your profession is what?
Ophthalmologist.

"A.

What is that?
Diseases of the eye.

"Q.

And, how long have you specialized in

"Q.

that?
"A.

About twenty-five years, sir.

"Q. And, you are licensed to practice medicine
in the State of Utah?
"A. Yes, sir.

"MR. BERTOCH:
Palmer qualifies.

I will stipulate that Dr.

"MR. ROBERTS: May it be that the record may
show that, Your Honor,
"THE COURT: It may.
"Q. (By Mr. Roberts) Have you had occasion
to examine Mr. Clarence Stamp?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

How many occasions?
On two occasions.
The first occasion was when?
November the 19th, 1954.
Here in Salt Lake City?
That is right.

"Q. Will you tell us what your examination
disclosed?
"A. Examination of the right eye revealed
four to six small crystal-like foreign bodies in the
cornea directly below the apex, that is, the center
of the cornea at 7:30 o'clock.
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"Q. First, Would you tell us what the cornea
of the eye is?
"A. Well, the cornea is the watch crystal of
the eye. It is the transparent tissue that covers the
anterior surface of the eye in front of the anterior
chamber. Does that answer it?
"Q. Yes, I think that is clear. Now, will you
continue then, Doctor?
"A. Quote: 'The rest of the cornea is clear.
The apex of the cornea seems clear. The anterior
chamber is deep. The iris appears very normal; it
is active; pupil is small and round and active. The
anterior surface of the lens is perfectly clear-in
fact, the entire lens is clear.' Now, unquote.
"Now, that was the right eye. Examination of
the left eye show several small crystal-like foreign
bodies, one about two milimeters from the limbus.
The limbus is where the colored part and the sclera,
or white part of the eye, comes together. I would
draw this if you would like for me to.
"MR. ROBERTS: Maybe it would be helpful
if you would, Doctor, and then we could get a better
picture of it."
(Witness goes to the board.)
"THE WITNESS: Now, this is an eye.
"THE COURT: The drawing that the Doctor
made may be marked Exhibit Four.
"THE WITNESS: Now, this is a drawing of
the eye that we cut in half this way (Indicating),
and look from the side, and this is the cornea, and
this is the clear part of the eye. This is the iris
(Indicating) , and this is either the brown or blue
or grey part of the eye, and this is the pupil, the
hole, and behind the pupil is the lens, and then this
is where the vitreous chamber is and the anterior
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chamber, and this is the vitreous chamber. Now,
there were several foreign bodies hit this gentlemen-luckily, not in the center of the cornea, but
adjacent to the center, and he had four or five crystal-like foreign bodies, like you would find in a torpedo-little grains of sand buried in his cornea-not
through the cornea, and each place that the foreign
bodies hit they leave a very small-in what we call
the nebula-little tiny scars. Now, the scars are
not too dangerous if they are not in the center, because it stands to reason this is the most part of the
cornea in front of the pupil.
"Q. Now, that was the left eye-you said how
many?
"A. Let's see~I stated several. That means
three or four or five small foreign bodies. Now,
these were embedded in each eye-in each cornea.
"Q. Could you tell us whether there were foreign bodies in the eye which had worked out?
"A. At that time there were several places
that the foreign bodies probably had worked out,
but many of these were present at that time I saw
him.
"Q. That was the first time?
"A. That is right.
"Q. Now, did your examination disclose anything other than what you have told us?
"A. Let's see-now, other than these foreign
bodies in the left eye, adjacent to, and out of the
apex of the cornea, there was no other pathology
found.
"Q. What about the sight?
"A. The sight was at that time 20/20 without
correction, and he read the finest print, J eager One,
without difficulty, although this man was forty-three
years of age, and at this time would have necessarily
have accepted a plus-fair for reading.
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"Q. And, then your next examination of Mr.
Stamp was when?
"A. My next examination was yesterday.

And, will you tell us what that examination disclosed?
"A. Under the slit lamp, which is the microscope, no scleral injection. That means the eye was
not red. The same nebulas or scars and small bits
of foreign bodies were found in the cornea, as previously described. In a few places, one at five o'clock
about two-and-a-half millimeters from the limbus
seemed to have worked out and healed over. The
apex of the cornea seems free of any foreign bodies
or scarring. The pupil is round, even, and active.
The iris is of normal color, and the lens is clear,
that is the right eye cornea. Left eye cornea, likewise, has the same scarring which consists of smallminute white areas where the little pebbles struck
the cornea. A good many of these seemed to have
worked out, because it is hard for me to find any
definite foreign bodies in the cornea. There is one
at three o'clock about two milimeters from the limbus; that is definitely present. The apex of the
cornea is clear, the iris is active, the pupil is round
and even, and the lens is clear. There is no scleral
injection. The back of the eye, or fundus of the
posterior surface of both eyes were found to be
normal.
"Q.

"Q. Between the two times you examined him,
had some of these particles worked out?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Could you describe that process, please,
which occurred?
"A. What occurs is that the little rocks or
grains of sand worked to the surface of the cornea,
and as they worked to the surface of the cornea
there is feeling of a foreign body at the time being
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just as if you would get a grain of sand in your eye.
Then it is necessary probably for that person to sleep
over night so that the lid isn't working up and down
over the cornea for that little area to heal, but it
heals very rapidly and very readily if it is not infected. Then the next morning the patient has no
feeling of the foreign body and has gotten rid of
another little particle.
"Q. And, what about the chances of infection
in connection with working out of these small foreign bodies?
"A. There is very little, because we-of course
we can receive-get infections any time, and you
are more prone for the simple reason that the patient
might rub their eyes at that time, but an eye stays
remarkably clear, unless some dirty hankerchief or
some attempt with a dirty object is used to remove
the foreign body from the cornea.
"Q.

Doctor, is there discomfort to the working

"A.

There is like a foreign body being in the

"Q.

Does the eye water?
Yes, waters and irritates and gets a little

out?
eye.
"A.
red.
"Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or
not the foreign bodies that are present there now
will come out in the future?
"A. No, I wouldn't know. I believe most of
them have worked out that are going to work outit's been a year.
"Q. And, what can you say for the future so
far as his eye is concerned?
"A. I can't say. I don't feel that Mr. Stamp
is in any danger.

"MR. ROBERTS: You may cross-examine."
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CROSS EXAMINATION
"BY MR. BERTOCH:
"Q. Doctor Palmer, if I understand you correctly in your examination of November 19th-I
think this accident occurred on November 6-at that
time you discovered apparently that the accident
had not in any way impaired his vision, is that
right?
"A. That is right.
"Q.
time?
"A.

And, I suppose you told him that at that
I did.

"Q. And, today you find now after several
months has past that your opinion at that time is
confirmed there still appears there is no harm done
to the eyes as far as vision is concerned?
"A. No. I don't think so far close work or
distance or field of vision.

•

"Q. I believe you prescribed glasses for him
in November-that had nothing to do with the accident?
"A. That is true. In other words, his need for
glasses for distance were so small I couldn't prescribe for him, but the need for close work glass
was due to the forty-four years of age.
"Q. In other words, there is no object that
the accident had anything to do with requiring
glasses?
"A. Not so far as my examination so revealed.

"Q. These foreign bodies are working outdo you think if they don't work out will he be conscious of them at all?
"A. I don't believe so.
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"Q. You see no reason why he should have
irritation from them?
"A. I don't see how it could. He has no scleral
injection in the eye.
"Q. And, actually they aren't very serious?
"A. Well, I don't think that very much damage was done to his ability to see or ability in the
future to see.
"Q. As far as you know there was no damage
done to his ability to see.
"A. That is right.

"MR. BERTOCH: That is all. Thank you,
Doctor.
l\1R. ROBERTS: That is all. May the Doctor
be excused?
"THE COURT: You may be excused. Thank
you."
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY
THE JURY WAS EXCESSIVE, APPEARING
TO HAVE BE·EN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE
GROUNDS THAT THE VERDICT OF THE
JURY WAS EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE PLAINTIFF TO MAKE A REMITTITUR OF A PORTION OF THE AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT
AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO HIS DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY
THE JURY WAS EXCESSIVE, APPEARING
TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.
A.

The Verdict

The verdict (concurred in by only six of the jurors)
awarded defendant the sum of $12,500 for total general
damages, diminished by reason of contributory negligence
in the amount of $2,500, leaving net verdict of $10,000.
$12,500 is the figure we are concerned with in determining
whether or not the verdict was excessive (Duffy vs. Union
Pacific Railroad Company, 218 P. 2d 1080, 118 U. 82;
Wheat vs. D. & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 250 P. 2d 932, and
Justice Crockett's concurring opinion Moore vs. D. & R.
G. W. R. R. Co., decided 1955, 292 P. 2d 849).
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B.
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K!

D[.
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:liT
:E~

Extent of Injury

The only special damage suffered by the plaintiff was
the loss of 11 or 12 days' work; and since his wage was
between $550 and $600 a month, his total wage loss was
approximately $200. Therefore, we must conclude that the
remaining $12,300 was awarded for "pain and suffering
* * * both mental and physical * * *" and "loss
of bodily function, if any, which plaintiff has suffered or
which plaintiff will probably suffer in the future." (Court's
instructions.)
Defendant contends that the verdict is so grossly disproportionate to any amount of damages which could have
fairly been awarded, as to make manifest that the verdict
was so suffused with passion and prejudice that the defendant cannot have had a fair trial on the issues. The
verdict is so excessive as to show that it must have been
motivated by prejudice or ill will toward the defendant.

f:

:{i:
ill
~rt
~.r

IJ~;

~.i

It is reasonable to conclude, of course, that the plaintiff, after consultation with skilled personal injury counsel
before trial, would attempt to dramatize and stretch his
mental and physical pain and suffering as much and as
far as his conscience would permit; and it is also reasonable
to believe that his own doctor's testimony would be a more
reliable guide to the extent of his injuries than plaintiff's
own testimony. According to his own doctor's testimony
his injuries were comparatively minor, and any difficulty
he was experiencing at the time of trial, or would experience, if any, in the future was negligible. His vision was
20;20 uncorrected, his eyesight in excellent condition for
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a man 44; and the only discomfort he would experience
would be the possibility of the working out of a few foreign
particles, which discomfort would be minor, and his doctor
believed that all of the particles had worked out that were
going to work out and that he would not be conscious of
or damaged by those that remained in.
His doctor said, "I don't feel Mr. Stamp is in any
danger.''
Plaintiff's counsel will try to make much of the mental
suffering of the plaintiff from the date of the accident to
and beyond the time of trial. It should be noted in that
regard that within two hours after the accident plaintiff
knew he had not lost the sight of his right eye, and on the
morning of the third day the bandage was removed temporarily from his left eye and he knew he had not lost his
sight in either eye. ~~en he was sent home on the fifth
day, he undoubtedly knew no serious harm had been done
to his eyes. He denies the doctor told him at that time or
a week later on November 17 that there was no permanent
injury to his eyes, but he also says he did not ask the doctor
that question. If he was worried at all at that time, it is
inconceivable that he would not inquire about the future
affect of the accident on his eyes. Dr. Palmer testified that
on November 19, two weeks after the accident, he found
the accident had not in any way impaired his vision, and
he told the plaintiff that at that time.

If the plaintiff has had any mental apprehension as to
the condition of his eyes since that time, it has been an unreasonable and unfounded apprehension. The fact undoubt-
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edly is that since that time, and probably since he left the
hospital four days after the accident, he has had no mental
suffering.
C.

Excessiveness of the Verdict
(1)

Comparison with Utah Cases

How excessive is this verdict? I think the case of
Duffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 218 P. 2d 1080,
118 U. 82, decided by this court in May 1950, is of considerable assistance as a standard of comparison. Duffy was
working as a rear brakeman, and his operation of a switch
caused a hernia at the site of a previous gall bladder operation incision. He was hospitalized for thirteen days and
endured a painful operation-more painful in its immediate
after effects than the ordinary hernia operation, which
itself causes excruciating pain during the convalescence
period-more serious because extra surgery was made necessary by the previous incision in order to diminish the
possibility of recurrence.
Duffy was off work from February 28 to June 16, a
period of 3~~ months (compared to Stamp's 11 or 12 days),
and his loss of earnings amounted to $1,300 (compared to
Stamp's $200).
The jury awarded Duffy the exact amount awarded to
Stamp, to wit, $12,500, and it was reduced due to contributory negligence to $9,000. This court ordered a conditional
remission of $4,000 of the net verdict, leaving verdict the
sum of $5,000.
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The Court said :
"We must assume that the jury awarded plaintiff the sum of $1,300 for loss of wages, which were
his only established special damages, and this leaves
the sum of $11,200 for general damages. When we
get in this domain reasonable minds might differ as
to what amount is excessive. However, there must
be a limit beyond which a reasonable jury cannot
go and the limit must be determined on the gross
amount of the verdict and not the net amount. Conceding that jurors in different states and counties
have different monetary standards and different
ideas as to the value of pain and suffering; that
present day costs of living are comparatively high;
that the purchasing power of the dollar has decreased to approximately one-half of what it was
some ten years ago; that we are seemingly in an
inflationary spiral; and, that by all reasonable standards verdicts should be larger than they were at
that period; we are, nevertheless, of the opinion in
this case that the damages awarded by the jury have
no foundation in fact, and are so grossly excessive
and exorbitant as to convince the members of this
court that the verdict is far in excess of what a
reasonable jury could determine as the maximum
amount awardable for this type of injury. For these
reasons it appears to us to have been given under the
influence of passion and prejudice.

"* * * The permissible minimum and maximum limits within which a jury may operate for a
given injury are presently far apart and must continue to be widespread so long as pain and suffering
must be measured by money standards. If the jurors
award damages which all reasonable persons would
conclude were not outside permissible limits, we
cannot invade their province by substituting our
judgment for theirs, but when we believe that all
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reasonable minds would conclude the limits have
been exceeded we are permitted to correct the error."

It appears patent that Duffy's injuries and damages
far exceeded those of Stamp. His physical suffering was
substantially greater and extended over a much longer
period of time. Stamp's initial mental suffering for the
first couple days was admittedly acute-more than Duffy's
----but Stamp's was short lived. Duffy's worry and concern
extended from the date of the accident on January 29 at
least until favorable results of the operation of March 3
were apparent to him. Having one incision break open,
he undoubtedly worried for some time after the successful
operation about the possibility of another rupture.
The court, I think, can take judicial notice of the fact
that there is little difference between the price level and
value of money between 1950, the time of the Duffy case
decision, and the present day; and, therefore, the Duffy
case provides a helpful standard of comparison. If $5,000
is the maximum limit to which reasonable minds should
have gone in the Duffy case, then Stamp is entitled to something substantially less than that.
Another Utah case which demonstrates how far out
of line the Stamp verdict was, is Wheat vs. D. & R. G. W.
R. R. Co., (supra), decided by this court in December 1952.
In that case Wheat, while working as a hostler (engine
handler), received an injury to his right shoulder, legs,
elbow and back on March 11, 1950. On April 5 he was
forced to discontinue working and was confined to a hospital from that day until March 13, during which time he
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was on a fracture board with his leg in traction. He was
at his home from May 13 to May 22, then returned to the
hospital for three more days. He was unable to return to
work until December 25. He claimed, and his· medical evidence corroborated his testimony, that from April 5 to
December 25 he suffered pain in his shoulder, ribs, elbow
and leg and could only stay up out of bed about three hours
a day. He was still suffering when he returned to work
but was required to return to work for financial reasons.
His doctor's testimony also revealed that he had a limitation of motion in his back which would be permanent. His
loss of wages amounted to $3,460.
The jury rendered a verdict for him in the sum of
$17,000, the trial court reduced it to $10,000, and that reduction was not disturbed by the Supreme Court. Certainly
Stamp's injuries and damages do not compare with those
suffered by Wheat; and if Wheat was entitled only to
$10,000, Stamp was entitled to only a small fraction of that
amount.
(2) Comparison with Other Eye Injury Cases
Verdicts and judgments in similar cases are material
in determining whether or not a particular verdict is excessive.
"The courts have repeatedly recognized both in
express statements and by constant references in
their opinions to amounts which courts and other
cases under similar conditions have allowed or held
to be excessive, the value of precedents with reference to the proper amount of daiDages to be awarded
for particular injuries."
Am. Juris., Vol. 15, Damages, Section 207.
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An examination of eye injury cases where somewhat
similar injuries existed or somewhat similar amounts were
awarded reveals the comparative excessiveness of the Stamp
verdict. I have limited this recital to cases decided in or
after 1948 inasmuch as it is well known that the inflationary spiral contributed to by the war continued upward at
least until 1948, and verdicts before that, we must admit,
would not be helpful because of the decrease in the value
of money that occurred most pronouncedly between 1939
and 1948. The cost of living index is, I believe, slightly
higher now than in 1948, but from 1948 on there has been
a leveling off so that cases decided during the last eight
years provide a reasonably fair guide, keeping in mind
money is slightly less valuable now than it was in 1948.

( ~)

Where Verdict Reduced

Jackson vs. Ellis, 212 S. W. 2d 715 (Arkansas,
1948).

The plaintiff was awarded $5,000 by the jury and it
was reduced on appeal to $2,500. The court considered the
evidence of injury and damages in the following language:
"Mrs. Ellis testified she was partially 'knocked
out' by the collision and had 'fading' periods. Was
taken to Basin Park Hotel (Eureka Springs) in an
ambulance, and the following day was sent to Fayetteville hospital, where she remained ten days. A
long gash was cut in one leg. It was 'standing open'
and bleeding. Ankle was hurt 'in some way' and
pains sometime recur. Legs and ankle swell. Was
also cut through the lip 'here'. The witness. said
there was a scar, but she didn't suppose the jury
could see it. Also thought eyesight was damaged-
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'I attribute it to injuries ; it "seems" I don't see as
well as before. Think injury is to both eyes, rather
than one. Pain under my hips was excruciating after
the accident. Am nervous, especially at night when
cars pass by and brakes "screetch".'
"Dr. J. F. Johns, who attended Mrs. Ellis at
Basin Park Hotel, and later sent her to Fayetteville,
substantially confirmed what the patient said regarding cuts and bruises. He added that her greatest complaint was of pains in the region of the right
hip, but the Doctor 'couldn't detect that there was
anything amiss, any injury to it.' He then explained
that pain could not be seen, and that he accepted
Mrs. Ellis' statements that she suffered; 'but', said
he, 'she was evidently under great shock and mental
stress and strain somewhere * * * I couldn't
say whether her spine was hurt-don't think any
doctor around here could.'"

Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. vs. Enloe et ux.,
225 S. W. 2d 431 (Texas, 1949).
The jury verdict for the plaintiff was $10,000 including
a thousand dollars for damages to plaintiff's automobile.
The trial court reduced the verdict to $6,000, and the Supreme Court reduced the verdict for personal injuries to
$2,100 and reduced the amount of the car damage from
$1,000 to $900, so that the total verdict was reduced to
$3,000. With respect to plaintiff's injuries the court stated
as follows:
"Billy L. Enwe, an army pilot, testified that
both he and his wife were thrown out of and clear
of his automobile; he was taken to Parkland Hospital where he was treated for a cut below the eyebrow, a cut in the right eyeball, a cut through the
bridge of his nose and a cut underneath his right
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eye; also a cut on his knee and shin, each about an
inch long; that it required 17 stitches to sew up the
cuts around his right eye; he suffered considerable
pain in his leg; was removed :by army ambulance to
Love Field Hospital where he remained for seven
days ; then transferred to Fort Worth airfield hospital where he was confined for six additional days;
he was grounded as an army pilot for five months,
due to impairment of his vision; his right eye now
tends to tire before his left eye ; eyelid flickers and
his eye waters; his eyebrow gets sore and he develops headaches from the soreness in his right eye
below where he was cut; scar tissue formed in his
right eyebrow and made a knot which feels numb;
when it is touched, the feeling is in his hairline; he
has headaches which originate around his eye about
every month or six weeks and last from 24 to 48
hours; the headaches cause pain ; the flickering of
the eye tends to cause it not to function as well as it
should ; and since the accident he has taken sick
leave a few days as result of such headaches."

Johnson vs. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
Ltd., 63 So. 2d 459 (Louisiana, 1953).
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Here the jury verdict was for $15,000 and reduced by
the Supreme Court to $12,500. In this case the plaintiff's
left eye was removed by surgery as a result of the accident
involved in the case. The court's discussion with respect to
the injury and damages is as follows:
"The Charity Hospital record reveals that plaintiff was twenty-seven years of age and had apparently enjoyed physical good health prior to the accident; his left eye was removed by surgery on June
lOth, 1951, and that he was discharged from the
hospital on or about June 19th, 1951. Plaintiff testi-

rit
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fied that the removal of his eye has resulted in pain
and suffering and caused the 'right eye to water' on
many occasions.
"The record leaves some doubt in our minds as
to whether plaintiff will be in a position to resume
the employment which he possessed on the date of
the injury, that is 'a cook' on a ship owned by the
Lykes Bros. Steamship company, where he earned
a salary of $230 per month plus overtime, room and
meals while aboard the ship. He is presently employed by the Electrical Supply Company, Inc., earning a salary of $35 per week. The American Experience Table of Mortality reflects that plaintiff, at
the time of the loss of his left eye, had a life expectancy of 40.36 years.
"We have carefully examined the record and
the jurisprudence, and we find that they fail to
sustain an award of $15,000; therefore, we are of
the opinion that the judgment should be amended
so as to reduce the award from $15,000 to the sum
of $12,500. In reaching this result we have considered all of the existing circumstances and the present
devaluation of the dollar, and we are of the opinion
that this award is proper. * * *"
(b)

Where Verdict Found Not Inadequate

Wilt, Jr. vs. Blazier, 114 A. 2d 111 (Pa., 1955).
Here the plaintiff was awarded $2,500 for injuries,
including the laceration of an eye reducing his vision to
20j70 corrected. He had expended $360.82 for medical and
hospital expenses and lost wages in the amount of $570.
He appealed on the grounds that the verdict was inadequate,
but the court held that the verdict was adequate.
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The court's discussion of the injury and damages is as
follows:
"The plaintiff Wilt also assigned in the court
below as a reason for new trial the inadequacy of
the verdict returned against Boggs. The court having granted a new trial generally for the reasons
stated, did not pass on the alleged inadequacy of
the verdict. Wilt, who suffered a serious injury to
his eye, expressed the belief that the impact caused
his head to go through the windshield. The doctor
called by him said that Wilt had a laceration of the
eye as the result of the accident and that his eyesight was impaired; that even with corrective
glasses, his vision was reduced to 20/70; that an
operation would not give him normal sight in connection with the other eye ; that without an operation he would suffer no pain in the future but would
suffer inconvenience. Wilt was discharged from the
hospital about two weeks after the accident and returned to steady employment with the same employer on April 11, 1951, 3 months and 10 days
after the accident. He stated that to regain his
employment he had to relinquish benefits in case
of sickness and accident and execute papers releasing his employer from liability in case anything happened to him in his employment. He stated that
before the accident he worked 'pretty regularly' and
earned about $190 a month. His medical and hospital expenses amounted to $360.83, his loss of wages
$570, or a total of $930.83. It appears, therefore,
that of the verdict of $2,500 about $1,500 was
awarded him for pain, suffering and inconvenience.
Undoubtedly a larger verdict representing a more
liberal allowance for pain, suffering and inconvenience would have been justified, but under all the
circumstances we are not disposed to disturb the
award of the jury."
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(c)

Where Verdict Found Not Excessive

My purpose in reviewing these cases where the verdict
was found to be not excessive is to show that in instances
of eye injuries where the extent of the injury was infinitely
greater than that suffered by Stamp, the verdicts were
less than the amount awarded to Stamp.

Skiers vs. Cowgill, et al., 59 N. W. 2d 407, (Nebraska, 1953) .
In this case an eight-year-old child permanently lost
vision of her left eye, had frequent and often eye and headaches, had noticeable scar just outside her brow line, had
bump on her head and would require surgery to correct a
turning out of the left eye and a drooping of the left eyelid.
The jury awarded a verdict of $10,000, and the appeal court
found it was not excessive.
The next two cases are particularly interesting because
they were decided by a judge rather than jury and were
not appealed by either party. They were both cases against
the State of New York and were decided by the New York
Court of Claims.

Gould vs. State of New York, 92 N. Y. S. 2d
251 (October 1949, N. Y.).
Here the claimant was 28 years of age and was injured
while a prison inmate. Because of the injury his right eye
had to be removed, and he was awarded $10,000. He asserted
that his left eye also was affected, but the court said there
was no medical testimony to support that claim. The court
said he was "fairly entitled to an award of $10,000 for
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pain, suffering, loss of his eye and such diminution of
earning power as may have occurred."
Pecor vs. State of New York, 132 N. Y. S. 2d
838 (N. Y., 1955).
Here the plaintiff, a girl 5 years of age, suffered contusions and abrasions of her head, arms and shoulders, a
cerebral concussion, laceration of her lower lip requiring
suturing which left a scar, and partial paralysis of a muscle
in her left eye, causing double vision when she looked up
and to the right.
The judge awarded her $4,500.
D.

Position of Appellant

It appears clear when Stamp's verdict and injuries
are compared with the cases reviewed herein, that the
$12,500 verdict was grossly excessive, far surpassing the
maximum limit reasonable minds would set.
POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE
GROUNDS THAT THE VERDICT OF THE
JURY WAS EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.
The argument of the previous point, of course, is applicable here, and there is no question under Utah law but
that the Supreme Court has the power and duty to correct
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the trial court's abuse of discretion and order a new trial
where the verdict, because of its excessiveness, appears to
have been given as a result of passion or prejudice.
The Utah Supreme Court in the Case of Pauly vs.
McCarthy, 109 U. 431, 184 P. 2d 123, in the opinion written
by the court on mandate from the Supreme Court of the
United States, carefully considered previous Utah cases
and laid down the following rule with regard to the function of the Supreme Court of this state in passing upon the
size of verdict.
"Some of the early cases recognized, at least
impliedly, that the trial judge might order a remission from an excessive verdict. Kennedy et al. vs.
Oregon Short Line R. Co., supra; Nelson vs. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 15 Utah 325, 49 P. 644.
But from the language used in these and other decisions a view developed that this court was powerless to interfere with a jury verdict, no matter how
outrageous. This view was exploded in the case of
Jensen vs. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138
P. 1185, 1192, where, after citing with approval
many of the cases above cited, we said:
" 'Still the jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled and unchecked. Hence the Code that a new
trial on motion of the aggrieved party may be
granted by the court below on the ground of "excessive damages appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice." Whenever
that is made to appear, the court, when its action is
properly invoked, should require a remission or set
the verdict aside and grant a new trial * * *
Whether a new trial should or should not be granted
on this ground, of necessity, must largely rest within
the sound discretion of the trial court.
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"'Still that court, in such particular, is not
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may nevertheless be inquired into and reviewed on an alleged
abuse of discretion, or a capricious or arbitrary
exercise of power in such respect. Such a review is
not review of a question of fact, but of law * * *
our power to correct a plain abuse of discretion or
undo a mere capricious or arbitrary exercise of
power cannot be doubted. * * *' "
It is defendant's contention that the verdict in this
case is so excessive as to show that it must have been motivated by prejudice or ill will toward the defendant and that
therefore a new trial should be granted unconditionally.
The case of Wheat vs. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 250
P. 2d 932, presents the Utah rule on this matter. The court
in that case said:
"We do not doubt that when a verdict is so
grossly disproportionate to any amount of damages
which could have fairly been awarded as to make
manifest that the verdict was so suffused with passion and prejudice that the defendant could not
have had a fair trial on the issues, the trial court
should unconditionally grant a new trial."
Later in the opinion the court says :

"* * * we regard the true rule to be that
if the verdict is so excessive as to show that it must
have been motivated by prejudice or ill will toward
a litigant, or that passion such as anger, resentment,
indignation or some kindred emotion, has so overcome or distorted the jury's reason that the verdict
is vindictive, vengeful or punitive, it should be unconditionally set aside."
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It is defendants' position that this verdict should be

set aside and a new trial granted unconditionally.
POINT Ill
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE PLAINTIFF TO MAKE A REMITTITUR OF A PORTION OF THE AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT
AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO HIS DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE.
If a trial court does not believe that the verdict was so

excessive as to show that it must have been motivated by
prejudice or passion, but he does believe that the verdict is
in excess of the maximum limit which all reasonable persons
would consider justified, then he should order a new trial
conditionally; that is, he should order the plaintiff to make
a remittitur of what the court considers to be the excessive
portion of the verdict.
If the Supreme Court believes that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to order a remittitur, the
Supreme Court has the power and duty to correct the abuse
by itself ordering a remittitur as a condition precedent to
the denial of a new trial.
This position is amply supported by the Duffy and
Wheat cases cited above. The Duffy case, of course, is not
in all respects the law in Utah now. The rule laid down
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in that case has been altered by the Wheat case. In the
Duffy case the court held that when it found a verdict was
the product of passion and prejudice, the court had two
alternatives: (1) ordering a new trial unconditionally or
(2) ordering a remittitur of part of the verdict as a condition precedent to refusing a new trial. The court in the
Duffy case said in this regard :

:a

"Section 104-40-2 (5), U. C. A. 1943 (Now Rule
59 (a) (5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), provides
that a verdict of a jury may be vacated and a new
trial granted by the trial judge when damages are
excessive and appear to have been given under the
influence of passion and prejudice. Trial courts of
this and other states grafted on to that provision
the right of the trial court to refuse to grant a new
trial when the damages were excessive if the winning party would consent to a reduction. The provision was thus extended by a judicial decision to
permit trial courts to require a remission of part
of the damages or suffer the consequences of a new
trial. This court placed its stamp of approval upon
that procedure and has on many occasions indicated
that our rights of review are limited to a determination of whether the trial judge abused his discretion in not granting a new trial unless the plaintiff
consented to a reduction in the amount of the verdict."

The Wheat case still provides the same two alternatives
~ei: but makes them mutually exclusive in any particular case.
e1lt The Wheat opinion rules that ( 1) if the verdict is the
product of passion and prejudice, there is no alternative
fiJi in that particular case-a new trial must be ordered unconditionally; (2) if, however, the verdict is excessive or
~~~
a~( "unduly liberal" but not found to be the product of passion

iii'
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or prejudice, then the court must use the other alternative:
order a new trial conditionally--conditioned on the failure
to make a remittitur.
The Supreme Court in the Wheat case gave its blessing
to that procedure in the nature of its decision. The trial
court had ordered a remittitur; the defendant appealed,
asking the unconditional grant of a new trial. The court
held the verdict was not so excessive as to evince it was
the child of passion and prejudice, and therefore denied a
new trial but agreed with the trial court that the verdict
was excessive and approved and upheld the trial court's
diminution of the verdict as a condition to denying a new
trial.
In the Wheat case opinion the court specifically recognized an area of wrongful excessiveness lying somewhere
between the "passion and prejudice" verdict and the "maximum limit" which reasonable men would not exceed, when
the court said :
"In Stevens Ranch & Livestock Co. vs. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., ( 48 Utah 528, 161 P. 459, 462)
we quoted with approval this language:
"'Unless it clearly appears from the court record that an excessive verdict in a personal injury
action resulted from prejudice or passion rather than
an undue liberality exercised by the jury in awarding damages, the trial court's action in remitting a
part of the verdict instead of granting a new trial
will not be disturbed.'"
In other words, the court implied that where a verdict
represents "undue liberality," though there is no finding of
passion or prejudice, a court is justified in reducing the
verdict.
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Justice Crockett recognized the possible propriety of
the use of this remittitur alternative, under proper circumstances, in his concurring opinion in the very recent case
of Moore vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company (supra) when he says:
"They (plaintiff's counsel) suggest that if this
court deems the judgment excessive, that under the
authority of Duffy vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company this court could order a remittitur. This may
be so under some circumstances, (italics supplied)
but if the verdict actually appears to have been given
as a result of passion and prejudice, that so taints
the verdict. * * *" Then, he says, the verdict
should not stand.
This court has either required or approved reductions
in verdicts in at least eleven cases. The cases and the approximate percentages of the net verdict constituting remission as recited in Ladder vs. Western Pacific R. Co., 259
P. 2d 589, decided 1953, are as follows:

Wheat vs. Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 250 P.
932 .................................. 41%
Falkenberg vs. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 P. 1008.63%
Duffy vs. Union Pac. R. Co., Utah, 218 P. 2d
1080 . . . . . . . . . . .
. ....... 44.4%
Mecham vs. Foley, Utah, 235 P. 2d 497 ....... 50%
Pauly vs. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. 2d
23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 30%
Geary vs. Cain, 69 Utah 340, 255 P. 416 ...... 47%
Eleganti vs. Standard Coal Co., 50 Utah 585,
.............. 41%
168 P. 266
Stephens Ranch & Livestock Co. vs. Union Pac.
R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 P. 459 . . . . . . . . . 40%
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Kennedy vs. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 18 Utah
325, 54 P. 988 ......................... 27%
Bourne vs. Moore, 77 Utah 184, 292 P. 1102 .. .47%
Sheperd vs. Payne, 60 Utah 140, 206 P. 1098 .. 25%
CONCLUSION
We believe it is within the power of this court in this
case ( 1) to find that the verdict was a product of passion
or prejudice and on that basis grant a new trial unconditionally, or (2) to find that the verdict was excessive and
"unduly liberal" even though not inspired by passion and
prejudice, and in that event order a remittitur of a portion
of the verdict on the condition that a new trial will not be
had if the reduction is accepted by the plaintiff and the
remittitur paid.
However, it is the opinion of the defendant that in the
light of the facts of this case, considering the limited injuries of the plaintiff and the exorbitant size of the verdict,
that the verdict is so excessive as to show that it must have
been inspired by passion andjor prejudice and that a new
trial should be granted unconditionally.
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